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Abstract: - Earthquakes are a common phenomenon in the Indian subcontinent. The catastrophe is severe in the epicenter of the 
earthquake, but adjacent areas may also suffer. It further leads to a post-disaster crisis since the earthquakes severely compromise 
the physical and social infrastructure of the affected area. Power outages are frequently observed during and after significant 
earthquakes. The duration of the outage in any area is significantly influenced by disruptions to the electric power lines that serve 
the area. This research targets to study the impact of earthquakes on the electricity-based power systems of Siliguri, West Bengal, 
India. Critical appraisal of disaster management plans has been conducted to develop an operational contingency plan for adequate 
power outage management in disaster-prone zones of the case area. A substitute distribution layout is provided in the post-disaster 
timeline to cater to the electricity needs in less affected zones immediately. The paper further discusses some strategies and policy 
recommendations to combat the infrastructural challenges generally caused by earthquakes.  
Key Words: —Disaster Prediction, Disaster mitigation, earthquake contingency, Electricity restoration. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Electricity is the backbone of modern society. It is essential 
since the critical infrastructure systems are dependent on the 
electric power supply. This sector's framework regulates the 
energy supply and further channelizes the policies. Natural 
hazards can disturb the electricity supply through power 
outages, which can lead to accidents. It brings economic 
activity to a halt and hinders emergency response until 
electricity supply is restored to critical services. This study aims 
to elucidate the influence of earthquake occurrence on the 
power grid recovery time. For this purpose, impact-based 
analysis of the power grid performance during earthquakes was 
institutional to this research. 
Natural hazards like earthquakes affect the physical 
infrastructure in different ways. Earthquakes cause damage to 
heavy equipment (such as generators and transformers), ground 
failure, and soil liquefaction, which can be devastating to 





Electric systems are particularly vulnerable to seismic forces 
and suffer extensive damage in earthquakes. Since we cannot 
avoid them, adequate mitigation strategies can lead to effective 
restoration at affected sites. Equipment anchoring at stable 
locations can arguably reduce the exposure to ground failure. 
Recovery time is sensitive to external factors driven by the 
balance of in-situ repairs and capabilities. However, the 
immediate recovery may be time-consuming due to inadequate 
access to damaged facilities, landslides, congestion, and 
disaster debris. Based on a literature study, it is identified that 
the time to restore power supply ranges from a few hours to 
months in case of severe damages, but more frequently from 1 
to 4 days in case of minor / fewer damages. Microclimate and 
weather conditions at the site affect transmission and 
distribution equipment through geomagnetically induced 
currents (GICs), which can potentially impact the entire 
transmission network that can severely damage the 
infrastructure establishments of the site. 
According to existing case studies, geomagnetic storms can 
cause abnormal operation or equipment damage significantly. 
However, early warning and predictions can help to manage the 
post-disaster outcomes. Efficient disaster forecasting can 
provide transmission system operators the necessary 
information to prepare for a disaster.  System-wide 
incorporations are the driving forces of recovery time post-
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earthquake. When damage is limited to minor alterations like 
wire tripping of appliances, restoration time is less than 24 
hours. However, significant repairs of damaged equipment may 
take up to several months. In disaster preparedness, factors 
affecting the power grid recovery time in the aftermath of an 
earthquake include disaster resilience of utilities and recovery 
potential of critical infrastructure (mainly transportation and 
telecommunications). Hence, resilience is critical to disaster 
management. 
II. IMPACT OF EARTHQUAKE ON THE ELECTRIC POWER 
SYSTEM 
Earthquakes damage the power generation, transmission, and 
distribution subsystems by compromising the structural 
integrity of the ground.  The equipment failure results in severe 
structural damages. Earthquakes cause different types of 
disruptions to electricity networks. Natural events may not 
generate system failures. They can cause significant damage to 
the underlying systems at multiple levels, which may further 
lead to prolonged recovery and restoration. This paper outlines 
the type of damage incurred to power grid components due to 
earthquakes by identifying the extent of damage that affects the 
post-recovery time. Ground deformation, settlement 
deterioration, soil liquefaction, lateral spread are expected 
outcomes in the advent of earthquakes that cause severe 
damage to buildings, large transformers, and other heavy 
equipment. Soil liquefaction not only affects the buried cables 
but also significantly causes foundation failure of transmission 
towers. Simultaneously, earthquakes severely damage 
transportation networks and nodal hubs like ports, airports, 
railway stations, metros, bus terminals, etc. Road networks, 
Highways, railroad bridges are most vulnerable since they can 
hinder the transport infrastructure permanently. Seismic forces 
can cause structural damage to Telecommunication. Most 
common damages include disrupted mobile network cell towers 
and two-way radio repeaters. Electricity supply companies rely 
on two-way radios and cellular telephones to coordinate repair 
and maintenance crews in daily and emergency operations. 
These disruptions practically bring urban areas to a standstill. 
The disruption of telecommunications poses a severe crisis to 
the emergency services than any other critical infrastructure 
sector. Lack of communication, damages to transport networks, 
delay in emergency response can affect immediate mitigation 
strategies in the affected site. Hence, there is a need to address 
these criteria to reduce delays in recovery time for further 
restoration of activities post the disaster. 
III. STUDY AREA PROFILE 
Siliguri is located at 26.71°N and 88.43°E in the Himalayan 
foothills. It is often regarded as the gateway to North-East India. 
It is vital to the state of West Bengal since it is the third-largest 
urban agglomeration after Kolkata and Asansol. It is the 
headquarters of the plains sub-division of Darjeeling District of 
West Bengal and is situated 392 feet above mean sea level on 
the river Mahananda. According to the CDP Report of Siliguri, 
it is located in proximity of three international borders 
(Bangladesh, China, and Nepal). The connectivity of Siliguri 
from Kolkata is by NH-31. It has three railway stations, namely, 
Siliguri town, Siliguri Junction and New Jalpaiguri. The 
Bagdogra International Airport, situated about 15 km away, is 
the only airport in the region. According to Census 2011, the 
city's population was 5.13 lakhs. Out of 47 wards, 14 wards fall 
in the Jalpaiguri district, and the remaining 33 wards in the 
Darjeeling district. The population density of the city is 11,274 
persons per sq. km. The literacy rate of the Siliguri urban area 
stands at 79% and the sex ratio at 946. As per population growth 
trends and future economic growth projections, Siliguri's 
population would increase from 5.1 lakh in 2011 to 9.12 lakhs 
by 2031 and 11.31 lakh by 2041. 
IV. DISCUSSION 
Siliguri faces earthquakes almost every three months. Two 
quakes of magnitude 3.0+ have been faced recently in May 
2021, the largest being a 3.8 event. Hence, it is detrimental to 
provide strategic, operational contingencies to combat the 
disastrous outcomes. The following is a discussion of crucial 
mitigation strategies by identifying the type and severity of 
damage to buildings, equipment, transmission, and distribution 
lines in Siliguri. In this research, we critically analyzed the 
electric power infrastructure in the case area through secondary 
sources of information. Buildings in electric power networks 
comprise control rooms, heavy equipment, turbines, and 
transformers. Most buildings identified in this study were 
structural sound. They were of reinforced concrete frame, 
masonry (reinforced or unreinforced), or mobile structures. 
These buildings were not significantly high (between one to 
three stories), which is advantageous to their seismic 
performance. Multi-story buildings do not have a beneficial 
seismic performance, primarily if heavy equipment is located 
on the upper floors. However, Electricity utility buildings have 
performed exceptionally well in the past five earthquakes in the 
study area. According to the Comprehensive development plan 
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of Siliguri, there are 39 existing facilities comprising 
substations and power plants. These facilities were subjected to 
peak ground accelerations (PGA) between 0.15g and 0.97g. It 
was highlighted that, out of all the facilities, we noted severe or 
catastrophic structural damage to buildings only in five of the 
cases. In two cases, PGA was 0.69g and above. Building 
damage was caused by ground failure (landslide, liquefaction, 
slope failure) in the other cases. Thus, ground anchoring is 
identified to be a crucial mitigation strategy for faster recovery. 
Catastrophic structural damage may increase recovery time as 
restoring the critical equipment existing in the vicinity of the 
affected buildings is a time-consuming process. In addition, 
debris from collapsed buildings may damage adjacent 
equipment. They also pose severe health risks for the 
emergency response teams and those stuck in the debris. Hence, 
we should not compromise the structural integrity of buildings 
to prevent delays in recovery. Emergency Batteries that provide 
power to protective equipment are especially vulnerable to this 
type of failure. They are crucial for backup power provisions to 
protective equipment, control centers, and telecommunication 
systems in post-earthquake hours. However, unanchored 
batteries may slide and topple, while anchored batteries 
generally remain undamaged. Large Power Transformers 
(LPTs) are often extensively damaged from inertial seismic 
loading. Depending on the ground motion intensity, the damage 
to massive equipment from rocking may range from slight to 
catastrophic. 
The slightest form of damage is identified to be tripping of 
equipment protection devices because of seismic vibration. 
These are generally reset and re-energized within less than 24 
hours after the earthquake in case of minor alterations due to 
earthquakes. Most evidently, strong tremors can lead to 
equipment failures in case of a faulty foundation. LPTs, 
Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs), turbines may break off 
from their foundations and tilt, topple or move horizontally. 
Tilting or toppling can cause the transformer oil to drain/leak. 
The earthquake load distribution is in proportion to the relative 
strength offered by the resisting members. Therefore, 
systematic anchoring and strong isolation of the base are 
successful mitigation options.  
In the next segment, we critically analyzed telecommunication 
services in this study. In the previously recorded seismic 
activities of the last five instances, numerous reports have 
identified mobile tower disruptions, two-way radio disruptions, 
lack of cell network due to lack of battery power during 
prolonged power outages, backup generators failing to start due 
to lacking fuel. The resulting loss of two-way communications 
between a power utility and its repair crew is an important 
parameter that determines the power grid recovery time. These 
are most critical for the post-disaster emergency teams to cater 
to the immediate needs of the people. Modern emergency 
systems use two-way radios and mobile phones intensively, 
especially in the emergency response stage. When both run out 
of power, rescue teams, ambulance, police, and other agencies 
fall back to their redundant systems. Thus, in these 
circumstances, local radio stations, satellite communication, 
landline connection can only prove helpful in receiving 
disaster-related information and updates. 
At the power generation, transmission, and distribution levels, 
some key deliverables have been identified that can be 
efficiently administered in the case area. In case of minor 
damages to supply lines, we can reroute power by switching to 
a backup configuration. In case of significant damage, few 
critical nodes can be repaired, and the electricity supply may be 
restored. Furthermore, spare equipment and materials can be 
used to repair some damages, which is economical and 
timesaving. Distribution Systems Operators (DSOs) stockpile 
equipment to handle extensive repairs, while additional items 
are available on order. 
V. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
From the policy perspective, the idea is to come up with 
efficient policy interventions, which target the safety and 
security of Siliguri's electricity supply. Administrative 
Jurisdiction over adequate disaster management for the power 
supply exists at various levels. The electricity supply chain 
derivative is recognized by public and private stakeholders, 
which have authority over post-disaster management. 
 Policy-level recommendations should be aligned to achieve 
disaster resilience at the core system infrastructure level.  
Energy-related regulations focus on maintaining a balance 
between demand and supply.  Civil protection regulations 
require States to produce comprehensive state disaster 
management strategies.  
However, it does not specify how we can utilize critical 
infrastructure to mitigate earthquake risks. Critical 
infrastructure policies are focused on contingency Plans, which 
target power grid resilience by identifying various threat 
scenarios. Without a proper understanding of disaster 
resilience, critical infrastructure plans may not target the 
necessary response measures. 
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Fig.1. Electricity distribution layout of Siliguri 
A. Consistency in Scenario Development 
Whenever possible, administrative bodies in the city should 
conduct risk assessments concerning a probable set of alternate 
scenarios. Here, policies should target strategic needs for 
adequate risk management.  The state has used a consistent set 
of scenarios to conduct both the National Risk Assessment 
under the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) 
Decision and the identification of critical infrastructure under 
the Siliguri Critical Infrastructure Directive. We could amend 
the proposed recommendation on risk-preparedness in the 
electricity sector to include a similar requirement.  Critical 
infrastructure protection agencies could consider requiring 
identified National Critical Infrastructure Operators to include 
at least the scenarios identified in the National Risk 
Assessment. 
B. Integration of Risk Management Activities among 
Departments 
Risk management efforts should be integrated to maximize 
efficiency. Using the same set of scenarios across all risk 
assessments can provide a joint base for integrating risk 
management efforts and making the best of each policy area. 
For example, a city corporation or State Risk Assessment may 
identify an earthquake scenario. Based on this scenario, the 
National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) of this State 
may develop a hazard mitigation strategy, eventually supported 
by an action plan to develop its Operator Security Plan. The 
OSP will likely describe the impact of that scenario on the 
security of electricity supply in further detail compared to the 
city corporation. The measures stipulated in the OSP should be 
integrated with the national risk mitigation strategy to 
maximize the benefit/cost ratio of the interventions and reduce 
the risk stemming from prolonged power outages to a 
minimum. In addition, interoperability among different 
departments will lead to better disaster management with 
adequate disposal of resources. 
C. Integration of Risk Management Activities among 
Departments 
Risk management efforts should be integrated at all levels of 
jurisdiction to get the best performances. For example, a city 
municipal corporation or State disaster assessment may identify 
the likelihood of an earthquake scenario. Based on this 
scenario, the State Disaster Management Authority (SDMA) 
may develop a hazard mitigation strategy through early warning 
mechanisms and pre disaster forecasting technologies. Further, 
they may develop an operation contingency plan (OCP). The 
OCP will likely describe the impact of that scenario on the 
electricity supply lines in further detail. The measures 
stipulated in the OCP can be aligned with the national risk 
mitigation strategy, to maximize the benefit/cost ratio of the 
interventions and reduce the risk stemming from prolonged 
power outages to a minimum. In addition, interoperability 
among different departments will lead to better mitigation with 
adequate disposal of resources.    
D. Building Resilience into the Grid 
Traditional hazard mitigation strategies have focused on 
strengthening the power grid components, such as equipment 
and buildings, based on the expected level of risk. Building 
resilience into the grid recommends system operations to 
continue performing their required functions when critical parts 
of the system are taken out of service and promptly return to 
normal operations after a disruption. Resilience requires a 
change in design to allow the grid to be reconfigured in 
response to various threats and enhance maintenance speed. An 
assessment of how long the microgrid will be expected to 
operate independently is necessary. In addition, use of smart 
grid technologies will allow power grid operators to automate 
the process of detecting an outage and reconfiguring the grid to 
reroute power to the affected area through available circuits. 
Spreading the investment over several fiscal years may be a 
feasible way to finance the design change. Despite the 
attractiveness of the idea, however, its implementation will 
require extensive operational and regulatory changes. 
E. Development and Implementation of Emergency 
Operations Plans by NDMA. 
The findings of this study have consistently demonstrated the 
need for System Operators to develop, implement and exercise 
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comprehensive outage management plans before disaster 
strikes. These emergency plans should describe emergency 
repair and recovery actions, assign responsibilities, identify 
resources, and address coordination and communication. They 
should also establish emergency response, including on-call 
arrangements of qualified personnel available to respond to 
natural disasters or other incidents.   
F. Stockpile Spare Items for Repairing Key Assets 
and Equipment 
The availability of parts and equipment for critical assets and 
facilities is essential for a faster recovery. Electric utility 
companies maintain a stock of spare items to handle daily 
repairs and minor emergencies. Extending these stocks to cover 
natural disasters. 
G. Prioritize Repairs to Critical Teams 
OCPs should identify critical teams ideally during the 
development of operation contingency plans. The latter should 
include critical resources and locations where It can provide the 
critical assets immediately. The recommendation should 
consider the potential consequences of the electricity disruption 
and the minimum power required to maintain functionality. 
Planning these aspects before an earthquake can highlight 
emergency services' priority-based response during the 
recovery phase. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The study determines to establish a qualitative strategy-based 
initiative for post-earthquake mitigation for electric power 
systems. The research can further establish the critical 
conceptual framework that can be undertaken for efficient 
earthquake mitigation at all levels with suitable policy 
interventions. Further, the research can explore the dimensions 
of intelligent energy systems, disaster resilience, and 
management. 
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